To the irritation of some I warned in August of the grave threat to British homeowners and to the global economy posed by the upheaval looming in the housing markets of Florida and California.
Two months on, the slump in US housing sales is obvious to all but the
most blinkered. And still many don't get it.
The FTSE, the Dow Jones
and the Nasdaq are still rising to delirious heights.
Traders seem
confident that the housing slump is just grit in the pistons of the
engine driving globalisation forward.
They are not alone. UK politicians, economists (with one or two rare
exceptions) commentators and consumers are treating the US housing
slump with equanimity.
Very few believe that a collapse in US house
prices can pose a threat to the UK, or to the liberalised and
integrated global financial system.
The US housing slump, so the argument goes, is just a "correction",
probably a necessary correction, and like the 2003-4 plateau in UK
house prices, can be expected to respond to supply and demand and
stabilise at the natural level. The problem it seems is that there are
just too many homes on the range.
Here in the UK house prices and levels of debt are regarded as
sustainable by orthodox economists. Borrowers are considered rational
and debt crises unlikely. (Have we been rational about pensions?) They
argue firstly that our asset prices far exceed our debts and are
therefore payable (even though we don't usually pay our debts by
selling our homes/assets) and secondly that our housing and other asset
markets enjoy rising prices because they are simply acting in
accordance with the laws of supply and demand. In other words, in the
UK "it's the shortage of houses, stupid".
In this column, I want to explain why a collapse in asset prices can
occur, regardless of the economic laws of supply and demand. But first,
back to square one.
The economics profession, as a whole, has a blind spot for finance.
Economists conduct their analyses without reference to the creation of
credit and debt. They regard money as "neutral" and ignore, on the
whole, the role of credit. As Schumpeter once wrote, economists treat
the "phenomena of economic life ...in terms of goods and services, of
decisions about them, and of relations between them. Money enters the
picture only in the modest role of a technical device that has been
adopted in order to facilitate transactions." So the Bank of England's
model of the UK has no debt components. Of course it is recognised that
there are, every so often, monetary "disorders" - but money is "of
secondary importance in the explanation of the economic process of
reality."
This explains economic orthodoxy's blind spot and apathy towards the
creation of today's gigantic credit/debt bubble - a bubble that should
cause greater concern than the rampant housing bubbles of
Anglo-American economies. It also explains the poor record and
extraordinary optimism of economic analysts and forecasters. In a
survey in March 2001, 95% of US economic forecasters predicted that
there would not be a recession in 2001. "Too bad", notes Nouriel
Roubini, "that the recession had already started exactly in March of
that year."
Why is a lending bubble the real problem? Because housing and other
asset bubbles are but an expression of that much bigger bubble: the
giant credit/debt bubble, which in turn is the result of easy
(unregulated) but costly lending. When the housing bubble bursts, it
will be because the lending bubble has burst, not because 'there are
too many homes on the range'.
Those of us who are pessimists believe that it is the US credit bubble
that is bursting. This is happening in what is a de facto deflationary
environment. Why should this be scary? Because the value or cost of
debt rises in a deflationary environment (the opposite happens under
inflationary conditions) and these increasingly expensive debts will
further drain American consumers of their hard-earned wealth. Even
while the US Federal Reserve pauses on interest rates, falling
inflation means that "paused" interest rates are rising in real terms.
As Americans endure shocks (higher real interest rates and therefore
bigger debt repayments, lower real wages, higher energy bills,
unemployment, bad health) their debts (and their negative savings rate)
will cause trouble. Elizabeth Warren of Harvard University has shown
that the American middle classes are on the precipice. "Fully 75% of
family income is earmarked for recurrent monthly expenses ... Short of
moving out of the house, withdrawing their children from preschool, or
cancelling the insurance policy altogether, they are stuck ... Today's
family has no margin for error ... Their basic situation is far riskier
than that of their parents a generation earlier."
Those that have "maxed out" on "refis" and other mortgage debts soon
will have to sell their homes - to pay off and manage their falling
disposable income and excessive debts. However, far from easing the
crisis, the downward pressure will apply, first, to those most indebted
and then to those considered wise and careful borrowers. Their assets
will fall in value along with those of the over-borrowed -
automatically raising debt-to-income ratios for sensible borrowers.
So the crisis will come about because the lending bubble will burst
first, and the asset bubble will follow almost immediately, if not
simultaneously. It was ever thus. (Think of 1929; of Japan in 1990; of
the dotcom crash).
There will be defaults (there already are) and then banking crises (it
is widely rumoured that Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, the big
government-backed mortgage lenders, are candidates). These will be
followed by business failures, and more rises in unemployment, leading
to lower economic growth, a fall in US demand for imports and a further
decline of the dollar.
A deep and sustained US debt-deflationary recession, will impact most
grievously on the global economy. We know, because the last time there
was a fall in US demand for imports in 2001, stock markets spiralled
downward, commodity prices fell, and government finances across the
world came under strain.
Because of the forced integration of the global economy; because of the
deregulation of the international financial system; because of the
crazy unregulated risks taken by hedge fund managers (most recently
Amaranth and Vega) on salaries of $150m (£81m), the coming crisis will
be systemic. Or to put it in the words of Tim Geithner, a governor of
the US Federal Reserve, the crisis will be "borderless".
There will be no place to hide. For the majority, that is. What of
those optimistic economists, bankers and financial rentiers? They will
gather together their wealth, scuttle off into obscurity, and let it be
known that blame for the crisis should rest with "reckless" US and
other consumers. In other words with the innocents who, encouraged by
politicians, economists, central bankers and financiers, have propped
up the global economy for two decades. Their borrowing and spending has
enriched the very rich and lifted millions of Chinese workers out of
poverty. Soon, blame will be heaped upon these American heroes - they
will be accused of borrowing too much and living beyond their means.
Thus will the perpetrators of these economic crimes escape and blame, once again, fall upon the victims.
 Ann Pettifor |