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Sri Lanka is once again at a critical point in its contemporary political history. After the ceasefire entered into with the LTTE by Ranil Wickremesinghe slid close to a rupture after a few years of peace, the two parties are trying to resurrect the no-violence pact.
The ceasefire and a temporary truce are urgent, competing needs if Sri Lanka is to be a viable economy and free of the disturbance of militant outbursts of violence. In the last four months, occasional violence erupted in the northeast. Time and again it was the Tamil people who suffered the most. Not only Tamils in the northeast, but even those in other areas encountered occasional ‘round ups’ by the security forces following outbursts of violence. The cordon and search operations have been most annoying and troublesome to the defenceless Tamils. Search mission of the police occur often in the pre-dawn hours. The armed forces unceremoniously and forcibly raid Tamil abodes and question the inmates in Sinhala, which is a language numerous Tamils do not understand. This is adding insult to injury because the silence of Tamils who cannot comprehend what the investigators are saying is reckoned to amount to culpability in crime. It is presumed, especially if those questioned are young, that they are supporters of lawlessness and violence or likely to resort to crime. Those questioned are rudely addressed after being bundled into vehicles belonging to the armed forces and taken forcibly into to ill-equipped, small and over-crowded police stations or other ‘safe’ buildings. People, particularly women and children have to undergo severe humiliation due to the lack or inadequacy of sanitary facilities even to answer a call of nature. To make matters worse, eventually, after enduring utmost discomfort, irritation and trauma, when they are released their neighbours treat them with suspicion. Therein the breaking down of relations within a heterogeneous community outside a war zone is set in motion again. In the northeast conditions were worse for citizens and school going girls and boys. Grenades were thrown at random, claymore mines were blasted at odd hours and innocent people were victims. Young and old inhabitants of the northeast fell victim to the aggression of state security personnel without any inquiry being conducted as to how the incident had occurred. It is in such a context that the present government, like the LTTE, concluded it was better to hold talks and at least initially devise a strategy that would ensure the ceasefire would be observed without breach. Also many an international power advised Sri Lanka to discuss the issues that escalate conflict and arrive at a truce. Since neither Sri Lanka nor the LTTE could fully ignore the counsel of international powers, they had to agree to discuss thorny problems and reach a settlement. As Norway had brokered the earlier ceasefire that was now crumbling, the international community naturally wanted Norway to take up the initiative once again. Nevertheless, several of the supporters of the present government had no love for, or confidence in, Norway. They alleged that Norway favoured the LTTE and the Tamils of the northeast. This was not an established fact but a figment of imagination strongly believed by the government’s supporters, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) the latter consisting predominantly of Buddhist bhikkus. As the talks began on the 22 February, the government appeared optimistic of amending the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement (CFA). The LTTE seemed indisposed to any amendment of the document. In regard to the ceasefire the LTTE wanted the government to disarm paramilitary groups. The Tigers required that the decks be cleared of any opposition propped up by the state and interfering with them in a military manner. The state however disowns allegations and does not accept that it favours anti-LTTE paramilitary bodies. Since the government indicated it would not consider a federal form of government nor would it budge from the unitary state final political and constitutional solutions were not on the cards. As these terms did not appease the LTTE they did not even come up for discussion. Talks were confined to the ceasefire. Even the United States and India (both on bad / indifferent terms with the Tigers) appear to consider a form of federalism as the framework to the meet the LTTE’s aspirations in governance but the LTTE has yet to state what sort of administration it considers appropriate. As the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) has gone back to a unitary state, it is clear that the GOSL does not understand the LTTE’s aspirations or what it has been fighting for all these years. Unless there is change of a radical nature in the government’s thinking, the prospect of peace in Sri Lanka looks bleak. Most people in Sri Lanka are praying and pleading for a truly effective ceasefire and more so for a quick and ultimate peaceful settlement to the conflict. People have suffered enough and are sick of this endless state of confrontation studded with violent killings and constant fear. Tolerance and equal treatment of peoples from all communities is what most Sri Lankans yearn for. When the curtain fell on the Geneva meeting, the government and the LTTE only agreed to implement the 2002 CFA. Goaded by the co-chairs – Japan, the USA, the European Union and Norway – the Sri Lankan state and the Tigers have agreed to meet again on the 21 April 2006. It is believed the dismantling of high security zones (HSZ), another controversial issue, will be taken up at these talks. Much will depend on how the two sides respond to the decisions made at the first Geneva meeting. They will dictate as to whether Sri Lanka will return to greater violence or take more meaningful steps towards peace. Source: Northeastern Monthly
 Professor Bertram Bastiampillai |