A reading of the political trends gaining ground in southern Sri Lanka today would indicate, unmistakably, an increasing determination on the part of the Sinhala-based political parties and intellectuals to demand a de-merger of the Northeast Province.

The logic of their thinking is quite evident in that the northeast merger provides an unhindered base for LTTE activities in the east in a manner that affects the Sri Lankan government and state.

As long as the UNP and SLFP/PA were the leading parties in the south, with a decisive clout over its politics, there had been no possibility of openly adopting a position against the permanent northeast merger. In fact the UNP’s policies took for granted the northeast as a single unit. As far as the SLFP/PA was concerned, it was never forgotten by former president Chandrika Kumaratunga that it was her father who first gave approval to the concept of the northeast as one political unit through the B-C Pact.

But now with the JVP and the Hela Urumaya gradually ousting the SLFP/PA from its preeminent position, the discontent in the south over a permanent unification of the north and east is being openly aired.

They adopted the same strategy against the P-TOMS agreement with the LTTE – that is taking the matter to court and hoping to overturn the political decision, or at least warding off any other legal challenge, and, more important, preventing an open political discussion on the matter because it becomes sub judice.

While viewed from this background, it is not surprising that the JVP-led Patriotic National Movement has called for a ruling by the Supreme Court, the more interesting fact is that the case against the continuance of the northeast merger is being argued by a legal luminary who was not only on the first government team to the Geneva talks in February this year, but was also appointed by President Mahinda Rajapakse to a committee to draft a new constitution for Sri Lanka. The Sinhala media calls the committee a ‘viduath mandalaya’ (committee of knowledgeable experts). But it puzzles the Tamil how a person who has taken a stand openly against northeast unification could be a member of a committee of knowledgeable experts who are said to be drafting a new constitution in an objective manner.

Besides making Hulftsdorp a battleground for the de-merger, the JVP-Hela Urumaya force is openly making it a political issue. The main reason for the leader of the Hela Urumaya Ven. Ellawela Medananda thero, to demand a de-merger is because a fractured Northeast Province would constitute a straightforward rejection of the concept of ‘demala nijabhoomiya’ (Tamil traditional homeland). This demand however not only enables the JVP to stall the Tamil ‘terrorists.’ It also discreetly rejects moves to form a separate Muslim unit in southeastern Sri Lanka. It is well known that the JVP has been very critical of Muslim nationalism of the east.

Having said this, one should accept the fact that for the government the de-merger is more a strategic issue than a political slogan. And that is because Trincomalee is within the borders of the northeast. In fact, even a confirmed anti-LTTE Tamil group like EPRLF (V) has staked the claim for Trincomalee to be the capital of the Northeastern Province. This means that irrespective of their internal differences, all Tamil parties want to retain their hold on the eastern port city.

If one were to look at the Trincomalee District, especially its demographic spread, one may see that successive governments have been trying to widen the district boundary and bring in areas like Seruwila, which did not originally come within the Trincomalee town and its neighbourhood. The significance of the inclusion of Seruwila should be seen in the light of the steady Sinhalaisation of the coastal area lying to the north of Trincomalee. The old Pudavai kattu is now Sagarapura. According to 1981 statistics the population ratio between the Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims was almost even – 33% each. Today however, the balance in all probability favours the Sinhalese because many Tamil families from the different settlements in the district have preferred to migrate to Mannar with the view of ultimately reaching India.

The reason for the social engineering carried out by the Sri Lankan state is due mainly to the harbour, which draws countries as far flung as Japan and the United States, to take an abiding interest in its future. India has through the Indo-Lanka Accord consolidated its claim already. It is said that even the Sethu Samudram project will not significantly diminish the importance Trincomalee harbour.

It is therefore understandable that Colombo would be loath to abandon Trincomalee to whatever Tamil political forces that control the northeast.

Besides Trincomalee, the most alluring factor about the east for those in authority at the centre is a segment of the Tamil population there, which could be promoted to take a hostile position towards the north. Using this, the military, if not the entire government, has been successful in dislodging the preeminence of the Tigers in the Batticaloa District. Despite Tamils from Batticaloa in recent times being prepared to repudiate Jaffna-Batticaloa tensions, the government, especially the military, has been successful in creating dissensions within northeastern Tamil unity. To that extent it could be said Karuna has become the successor to Rajadurai. (Rajadurai was one the chief Tamil spokesmen of the Federal Party but shifted his stand later.)

While Colombo is not averse to a northeast de-merger because of the strategic importance of Trincomalee and the potential in Batticaloa to practice the art of divide and rule, things are not so simple. One has to be circumspect on arriving at hasty decisions on destroying northeastern Tamil unity because Tamils of the east do not act on the basis of identical political compulsions. In fact there are as many spheres of Tamil influence in the east as there are districts: Batticaloa is only one of them.

An important area of Tamil presence is the villages in the Amparai District. The ironic truth is that the Amparai-based Tamils have more faith in the Sinhalese of Amparai than in their Muslim neighbours. They accuse the Muslims of marginalising Tamil interests. Because of Muslim-Tamil tensions on the one hand and fears of the Sinhala military on the other, Tamils in Amparai are very conscious of their identity and political alliances.

The strength of the southeastern Muslims is derived from being essentially an agrarian community. Land-bound, they, to that extent, hold and need to hold, a sway over the place they live in. The significance of the Muslim population in the Kalmunai-Amparai areas is seen in the fact that the first Muslim political party emerged from here.

Therefore, from the point of view of the government, a de-merger would kill two birds with one stone. With a stroke of the pen, the claim for a southeastern Muslim unit can be ignored completely. A similar fate will befall the equally-harrowing demand to form an administrative unit for the Muslims to include Mannar, Mullaitivu, Batticaloa and even perhaps Jaffna.

Intriguingly except for politicians like Segu Dawood, even SLMC Leader Rauff Hakeem has not come out openly for the retention of the merged northeast. Hakeem’s answer that the Muslims were not consulted when the two provinces merged is politically clever. But at the same time, responses like this will only strengthen the dormant feeling among certain Tamils about going it alone. Be that as it may, it has t be said the concept of Tamil-speaking communities has its validity and strength.

The other unit of Tamil existence in multiethnic surroundings is Trincomalee. There is a substantial Tamil population not only in the town and the coastal fishing villages but also in Muttur. In spite of various incidents of violence Tamil-Muslim unity in the interior areas of the Trincomalee District has not broken down completely. Given the interest taken by the JVP in Kantalai and mounting communal tensions, Tamils of Trincomalee town and suburbs are very conscious of their Tamil identity. Even a de-merger will not transform this reality in any substantial way.

The third area of a large Tamil presence in the east is the Batticaloa District. It is today almost forgotten that in the early years of the Federal Party it was the Tamil youth of Batticaloa who spearheaded its political campaign. However, the white-collar Tamil population of the Batticaloa town has had a genuine grievance against the ‘colonialism’ of Jaffna in the past, and one sees that that stream has not entirely run dry. But there is also a need for the Tamils of Batticaloa to respond to the commanding Muslim interest in the district. Thus one cannot be sure that ‘Batticaloa’ could always be pitched against ‘Jaffna.’ If the de-merger becomes a political reality, the attitudes of the Batticaloa Tamils will definitely be very disturbed.

Adding to these arguments is the belief, very current in Colombo, that a de-merger would hasten the process of weakening the LTTE. Perhaps the JVP’s insistence on the exercise is because it feels that the Tigers could be thereby more easily contained.

Having examined the above which have, in some way or another, prompted the solidification of the move towards a de-merger, there remains one factor that has disturbing implications. The merger was not something which either the Tamil militant youth or the government of the day wanted. It was an innovation brought in by India through the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. Even the wily President J. R. Jayewardene could not prevent it. The question is: would India now accept a de-merger. In fact, it could even be argued that this is the best way Sri Lanka could register its disapproval of Indian attempts to dictate terms for political reconciliation.

It is generally rumoured that for strengthening Rajapakse’s political standing in the south, a move like the de-merger would be welcome. Now that a dialogue with the UNP is no more possible, the JVP alliance has to be sought and strengthened. And the consent for a de-merger is one way out of the political impasse.

But now that this has become also a matter for judicial decision, Rajapakse can safely walk on the knife’s edge without hurting himself. One final observation: if the de-merger is achieved, then there could be no major challenge to the unitariness of the polity. A final regret: It is that if the word ‘politics’ which has semantic affinity to ‘polity’ then the de-merger throws to the wind the future of the Sri Lankan polity in preference to the future of the politician/s.’

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