The President’s twin objectives cannot be fulfilled through a federal solution.
This confrontation is not about water. Despite the talk of ‘humanitarian’ missions, the truth, as the head of the international monitors, Ulf Henricsson, suggested, is that this war is about something else.
After all, the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE have resolved
numerous other far more controversial issues in the past four years of
ceasefire than a blocked water channel. And not once, but twice, Sri
Lankan bombardments have destroyed deals with the LTTE to open the
sluice gates.
It is now quite clear this is about Sri Lanka pursuing a military
campaign against the LTTE despite the constraints of the 2002 Ceasefire
Agreement (CFA). Whilst some observers are perplexed at the
government’s actions, an examination of its stated objectives suggest
this is not inconsistent behaviour.
President Mahinda Rajapakse’s administration has relentlessly pursued
two objectives since he assumed power. The first, like all his
predecessors, is to ensure he maintains power and secures a second
six-year term. And the second is to implement his manifesto, unsubtly
titled ‘Mahinda Chinthana’ (Mahinda’s thoughts).
What might appear crass, even stupid, on the international stage is, in
the Sinhala heartland, honest, even honourable. A promise to the people
is being kept.
The abrogation of deals with the LTTE is easily explained. After all,
the Tigers are the Sinhala nation’s arch foes and all is fair in love
and war. And this internal constituency is far more important to
Rajapakse than the self-interested members of the international
community.
Even at the internationally transparent talks in Geneva in February,
the Rajapakse government struggled to accept the legitimacy of the CFA.
And even though it finally agreed to implement it, soon after its
delegation arrived back in Colombo, it repudiated the Geneva 1 deal.
Within weeks, Army-backed paramilitaries resumed their campaign against
the LTTE and its supporters, sparking the low intensity hostilities
that has escalated steadily to war this month.
And it is not only agreements with the LTTE that have been scrapped.
Rajapakse’s administration has repeatedly assured the foreign powers
backing Sri Lanka’s peace process that it is committed to peace and
welcomes their support - and there is no doubt it certainly welcomes
their fiscal support.
However, in the face of increasing international pressure to deliver on
his various pledges, including Geneva 1, President Rajapakse’s response
was to court new allies abroad and to attempt to marginalize the
Norwegians by seeking direct talks with the LTTE.
When this clumsy political chicanery failed, Colombo had to respond to new pressures from the international community.
But he got an unexpected break: having virtually conceded that
President Rajapakse was never going to disarm the paramilitaries, the
international community changed focus from demanding Geneva 1 to
efforts pushing for a permanent political solution.
Pressure grew for a bi-partisan agreement with the main opposition UNP
that could reduce the influence of the ultra-nationalist JVP and JHU.
Rajapske’s response was to dust off an old Sri Lankan trick: the All
Party Conference (APC).
And he wasn’t very subtle, not even bothering to invite the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), even for show.
Furthermore, he sent an unambiguous message to the JVP and its allies –
and for that matter, the Sinhala and Tamil communities – by appointing
a group of Sinhala ultra-nationalists to the committee to draft his
administration’s proposals for power sharing.
Meanwhile, a ground breaking deal engineered by India between the UNP
and Rajapakse’s ruling coalition collapsed: no sooner had Delhi’s Envoy
left Sri Lanka, the President resumed poaching UNP parliamentarians to
the government benches.
Why, observers might ask, is the man deliberately damaging the
necessary steps to a stable negotiation process and a permanent
solution?
The answer lies in the twin objectives Rajapakse has never concealed: his political future and Mahinda Chinthana.
The UNP crossovers enhance his government’s stability whilst spreading
discord and disharmony within the UNP’s already disarrayed ranks. It
also makes joining the (more stable) government a more attractive
option for the savvy JVP.
At the same time, the delaying of a bi-partisan deal with the UNP also
put paid to any hope of the APC coming up with a pan-southern platform
for peace talks. It also bought time for the committee tasked with
coming up with power-sharing proposals.
Rajapakse’s most important success is outmanoeuvring Delhi’s interventions on behalf of the stuttering peace process.
Having politically re-engaged in Sri Lanka at the behest of both
protagonists, India could not have expected the degree of duplicity
that Rajapakse demonstrated with regards the bi-partisan deal that
Delhi’s envoy set up. Else India would not have staked its prestige on
it.
And then there is the military escalation by Colombo, despite India’s
reported insistence of restraint. Within a week of assurances to India
to prevent further escalation of the conflict and to pursue a
negotiated solution, Rajapskse unleashed a major military offensive
against the Tigers.
The only way to determine Rajapakse’s intentions is to understand his interests.
Bottom line, Rajapakse needs to pursue a solution to the ethnic problem
which is within a unitary state. Any other option risks alienating the
JVP and, more importantly, the Sinhala vote bloc which backed him last
November.
Besides, a federal or autonomy solution is at odds with Mahinda
Chinthana. There is no need for a bi-partisan agreement with the UNP if
you don’t need the two-thirds majority. You don’t need the majority if
you don’t intend to substantially change the constitution.
What about international opinion? Rajapakse knows full well that
international support for federalism is not based on any fundamental
commitment to the Tamils, but as a bid to buy off the Tamil separatist
campaign. If the threat from the LTTE was to diminish, so will
international pressure for autonomy, in his view.
This column has argued before that international guarantees against the
LTTE’s struggle means that even if a military effort by Colombo goes
awry, there will be no great political cost – Rajapakse would only
still need to agree to a federal model (and the JVP or JHU could not
fault him then for selling out).
But were he to be successful on the battlefield, Rajapske knows he
won’t be pressured to offer that much to the Tamils, a point reinforced
by the stated commitments to Sri Lanka’s territorial integrity by
several leading members of the international community.
He is much more likely to continue in power in either solution. But not
if he were to sell out to the Tamils by making a serious offer of
autonomy now.
These calculations have been apparent to Rajapakse even before he filed his papers for last November’s Presidential polls.
And since coming to power, he and his hardliner defence officials have
been preparing the ground for a military confrontation. That is why the
paramilitaries were not disarmed, but expanded and reinforced. That is
why the embargoes were not lifted.
Columnists in this newspaper argued as early as June 2005 that Sri
Lanka was planning a war in the east. This column did so again in April
2006.
The reasons for the present Sri Lankan military offensive in
Trincomalee are nothing to do with water or any other humanitarian
issue.
With the international community focused on the Middle East, President
Rajapakse has acted swiftly to take advantage of a fortuitous
controversy that erupted in the strategic eastern theatre.
Hence Rajapakse’s haste to escalate the violence despite the Sri Lanka
Monitoring Mission (SLMM) in the area being on the verge of resolving
this otherwise mundane water dispute.
Contrary to many international actors, the political vision behind
Rajapakse’s military offensive is not to weaken the LTTE and secure a
better position at the negotiating table.
It is to create the conditions under which a solution within the
unitary constitution can be offered on a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ basis to
the Tamils.
The international community has in the past backed similar weak offers.
Federalism entered the negotiating field only after the ferocious LTTE
violence of 2000-1.
In any case, there cannot be a limited war. If Rajapakse is successful
initially, the JVP and other Sinhala nationalists will insist the war
goes all the way to a total victory. As the National Movement Against
Terrorism declared in its recent poster campaign, the goal is ‘Onward
to Kilinochchi.’
As this column argued earlier, if the LTTE is able to resist his
military onslaught, then the most Rajapakse will have to offer is a
federal solution.
But that is sometime in the future. The question can be revisited then.
Right now, neither of Rajapakse’s objectives – staying in power for the
next decade, or delivering his vision of Sri Lanka, ‘Mahinda Chinthana’
– can be achieved through offering a federal solution. So war it is.
TG
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