Why does HRW have difficulty establishing credibility with the Diaspora?
In a complete reversal of their position, New York based NGO, Human Rights watch (HRW), which earlier this year described the Tamil Diaspora as caught in a ‘culture of fear’ of the LTTE this week turned to Tamil expatriates to exert their influence on the LTTE in support of human rights.
In March this year, HRW published a damning report claiming Tamil
expatriates were being terrorised by LTTE fund-raisers extorting money
from them to finance the war in Sri Lanka. The report, which was
specifically cited by the Canadian government when it banned the LTTE
in April, caused outrage amongst expatriates.
But on Saturday August 5, HRW Asia Director Brad Adams joined Professor
Philip Alston, UN Special Rapporteur on extra-judicial killings in
asking for the Diaspora to exert their influence on the LTTE to
implement their recommendations on human rights.
At an event in London, Professor Alston launched a Tamil version of his
report, which says, among other things that “the diaspora has a
responsibility to use its considerable political and financial
influence and funding to promote and to insist upon respect for human
rights.”
Professor Alston and Adams said it was vital that the Diaspora make it
clear to the LTTE that the war would not be won by territorial and
military considerations alone but by considerations of legitimacy and
respect for international human rights standards.
The Diaspora had a duty to ensure the LTTE met these standards, they
argued. Supporting the LTTE unquestioningly, said Professor Alston, was
like bringing up your child to do whatever he liked; it was
counterproductive and not helpful to the child because he would not
learn to act as a responsible adult.
The metaphor where the LTTE was likened to a ‘child’ of the Tamil
Diaspora is astonishing in the context of previous policy statements by
HRW and United Nations.
On the face of it, the event should have been a walk in the park for
the organisers. After all, who doesn’t subscribe to human rights
standards as a matter of principle? Philip Alston provided an
additional incentive (as if the matter of principle was not
sufficient). He said one had to be seen to be meeting international
standards of legitimacy in order to achieve political goals, including
that of a separate state.
But instead of support, the organisers were met with anger and a litany
of complaints against their organisations’ conduct from many of the
Tamil Diaspora. The event highlighted systemic disagreement between the
panellists and the sections of the Tamil Diaspora being addressed by
the former’s appeal.
After the conference, a clarification was sought from HRW on their
understanding of the extent of voluntary support for the LTTE compared
to the proportion that was being reportedly being pressured by the
Tigers.
Adams replied on behalf of Human Rights watch that he had absolutely no
idea. A member of the audience had claimed that the LTTE had the
support of eighty percent of the Tamil Diaspora. Mr Adams thought that
might well be true, but he admitted he did not really know.
In essence, Adams admitted they had no statistical information on the
extent of LTTE support among the Diaspora, and further that they had no
capability to obtain such information. The Asia Director of HRW said
this was the first time he had been to London to meet the UK Diaspora.
But Adams did not even accept that statistics had any bearing on Jo
Becker’s controversial report on fund raising by the LTTE and related
organisations. In short, HRW did not know if the people who had alleged
intimidation by fundraisers were a statistically significant proportion
of the overall population or not – even though the report had
repeatedly alluded that it was.
Adams argued that, in any case, HRW’s position was not a question of
mathematics or science. He refused to accept there was even a question
of proportionality. He said that if even one person felt that they were
being intimidated then HRW would find itself obliged to report on it.
But for anyone who read the original HRW report this comes across as a
major shift in position. The report painted a picture of a community
gripped by fear and ill served by British or Canadian police or their
parliamentary representatives. An entire section of the original report
was dedicated to why no prosecutions had been brought in the western
democracies where these offences were allegedly taking place.
It even claimed: “in Canada, the Tamil community forms a powerful
voting bloc, and many members of Parliament from ridings (electoral
districts) in the Toronto area are dependent on Tamil votes. Some
Canadian Tamils suggest that as a result, many members of parliament
are reluctant to address LTTE intimidation.”
Jo Becker, the author, in an interview with the BBC Sinhala service had
countered allegations of an underlying political agenda by saying “Our
only agenda is to safeguard the human rights of the expatriate Tamils.”
But Adams’ revelation that he has no idea what the Diaspora really
thinks or wants and that further they had not taken trouble to find out
sharply contradicts Miss Becker’s emphatic need to save the community
from the LTTE.
HRW had previously issued a qualification of its report, saying it was
‘qualitative rather than quantitative’. Brad Adams said on Saturday was
that the estimated several dozen people interviewed worldwide (the HRW
report itself prominently leaves out the sample base) between October
last year and February for Becker’s report had “appeared to give
credible accounts.” Readers have to take Jo Becker’s word for it
because the witnesses remained anonymous.
But even on a ‘qualitative’ basis the report runs into difficulties. A
search of the HRW website reveals that Becker, an experienced human
rights researcher, has written only two reports on Sri Lanka, both of
them virulently anti-LTTE. This despite the fact that of the over
thirty five thousand civilians killed in the Sri Lankan conflict the
overwhelming majority have been Tamil civilians killed by government
forces.
Becker’s March report was leaked to the Sri Lankan minister of foreign
affairs before it was published. The report immediately preceded and
was cited in the Canadian government’s ban of the LTTE.
The UK launch of Miss Becker’s earlier (November 2004) report (on child
soldiers) had been organised by well-known anti-LTTE radio station, TBC
(Tamil Broadcasting Corporation). One of Miss Becker’s co-panellists at
the launch was Virajah Ramaraj, the TBC’s program director. Ramraj, a
veteran of an anti-LTTE paramilitary group, ENDLF, was arrested by
Swiss police in March on long-standing criminal charges.
Ms Becker used a self-selecting sample for her March report. In other
words, people who wanted to complain and who were linked into the
network were invited. Ramaraj, also appears in Becker’s report, this
time as a witness, rather than as a fellow author. The interviews had
been conducted, in many cases, by long distance telephone calls to the
UK and Canada.
The report accepts that the Metropolitan police in UK concluded in the
face of specific complaints that there was no evidence of an offence.
But Jo Becker went on to say that Scotland Yard turns a ‘blind eye’ due
to political considerations. Adams reflected the same thinking when he
insisted last week that for Diaspora witnesses, HRW (and not the local
police force) was the ‘first place’ to which they could turn.
Yet Adams confessed that HRW did not have much knowledge of any of the
local Diaspora communities. By extension, the organisations does not
have the capability to assess the credibility or qualifications of its
sources. To counter this failing, HRW contends that in many ways it
does not matter: Adams says if even one person feels intimidated by
LTTE fund raising strategies, then that is enough.
But this position has deep flaws. Lobbying for proscription of the LTTE
(which is what HRW’s report does – successfully in Canada’s case) is to
deny the expatriate Tamils their right to support the LTTE’s political
project; politics. The politics of an entire community of respectable
citizens is being tarnished by a select few associates of the likes of
Ramaraj: the disregard for their views verging on the racist.
By ignoring ‘big picture’ analysis, Adams is holding on to a very
simplistic view of truth. There are lies of distortion and lies of
omission. HRW has indulged in both.
By focussing disproportionately on one human rights problem, others are
marginalised. In the Sri Lankan conflict there are a plethora of
abuses, including disappearances in government custody, torture,
massive proportions of long term displaced, military occupation,
arbitrary executions to name just a few.
HRW chose to prioritise a small group of people who unverifiably claim
their rights are being violated over many of those who argue their
rights are being defended against the Sri Lankan state by the LTTE. The
point here is that HRW, when it writes on Sri Lankan affairs, even on a
Diaspora issue, is intervening in the Sri Lankan conflict.
Even the merest respect for the numbers of rights abuses within the Sri
Lankan question would have led to very different set of priorities from
that chosen by HRW.
Almost a quarter of Tamils in Sri Lanka are internally displaced.
Arbitrary, racially profiled, mass arrests of Tamils in cities such as
Colombo are commonplace. So are cases of torture and disappearances.
In contrast to HRW, many of the Diaspora prioritise Sri Lanka’s rights
abuses differently. Stopping the greatest abuser, the state military,
is their concern. Many Diaspora Tamils argue for self-rule and autonomy
on this basis and back the LTTE’s political struggle on this basis.
They are aware the LTTE does not have a clean sheet, but, in their
view, this is not a concerning as securing the overall cause of
self-determination which, when realised will protect Tamils from the
Sri Lankan state.
Little surprise then that HRW has difficulty establishing credibility
with the Diaspora: the human rights goals of the two groups may be
broadly aligned in theory but in practice there is no agreement on
implementation.
HRW enunciates human rights principles but are (at best) dangerously
careless of the wider political impact of their work. The Diaspora on
the other hand pursues the collective human rights of their community
through the goal of self-determination and the LTTE.
For example, HRW deplored the impending exit of international truce
monitors because with fewer people on the ground it would be harder to
track human rights issues.
But the Diaspora saw the exit of the monitors as an inevitable
consequence of their countries’ proscription of the LTTE. The Diaspora
instead deplored the ban as a violation of their community’s human
rights. They are also well aware HRW’s controversial (and now suspect)
report contributed to the ban.
HRW deplored the large number of internally displaced people in the
island. But Tamil Diaspora activists with organisations such as the TRO
(Tamil Rehabilitation Organsiation) were furious because the ban also
indirectly obstructed their humanitarian fund raising. Again, such
activists see HRW as having targeted their struggle (in support of the
Sri Lankan state that caused those displacements in the first place.)
HRW’s apparent recognition that the Diaspora matters to Sri Lankan
politics comes somewhat late in the day. Notably, the Diaspora’s views
were not consulted before the proscription of the LTTE - in fact all of
the protests and appeals by the Diaspora were bluntly ignored. Instead,
HRW’s report was cited as evidence for a need to save the Diaspora from
the LTTE.
Ironically, Alston’s original metaphor of the parent-child is correct:
the LTTE relies on the Diaspora for financial, intellectual and moral
support.
But then it is impossible to seek a cooperative relationship with the
parent having just helped in the demonising and condemnation of the
child. If the organisers of last week’s meeting with the Diaspora were
shocked by the anger they were met with, they had only themselves to
blame.
J. T. Janani
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