At the SF Head Quarters, Jaffna, everything was in place to receive Gen. Fonseka. At 8.30 am, the Security Forces Commander, Jaffna, Major General G.A.Chandrasiri was at the tarmac.

Gen Fonseka could not make it on time- later he cancelled the visit. But, exactly at the time of his scheduled arrival, a barrage of artillery shells landed on the High Security Zones of Pallali and KKS, the first such attack since the LTTE’s failed Jaffna offensive in August, 2006.

The attack lasted nearly half an hour, during which about 15-18 artillery shells fell on and around the tarmac and in Maylady, Illakdy and KKS. Two shells fell on the tarmac.
A soldier of the Mechanized Infantry succumbed to injuries suffered from fragmentations of a shell which fell in Maylady.

Greater Worry

More than the attack, which caused no material damage, other than the above mentioned fatality, the timing of the attack is a cause for a greater worry. It is yet another indictment that the security establishment, indeed, its most sensitive sectors, are still being infiltrated by LTTE moles. On March 26, the Tigers’ nascent air wing ran sorties in Colombo, when the Indian built Indra II radars were dismantled for maintenance. It was anybody’s guess, that the timing of the guerrilla aerial attack was no coincidence. Last year, a few months after, Gen Fonseka resumed duties after he narrowly escaped the abortive suicide guerrilla attack, a small pack of explosives was recovered from the Army Head Quarters. The pack was too small to inflict serious harm, yet, it was suspected the explosives were smuggled in to test the security procedures and their loopholes.

There are further concerns: Did the LTTE launch the artillery attack from its traditional artillery positions located at the tip of Pooneryne, known as the Kalmunai Point. The Kalmunai Point a.k.a. ‘K Point’ has been the traditional artillery launching pad of the LTTE, from where guerrillas shelled Pallali and KKS August last year and in 2000 during the Tiger offensive, Unceasing Wave III.

Guerrillas are believed to be in possession of at least four 130 mm artillery guns in addition to eighty 120 mm mortars and over twenty 122 mm artillery guns. A 130 mm artillery gun has a firing range of 27 km. Draw a circle on the Sri Lankan Map with Jaffna at the centre. Of the guerrilla controlled areas in the Wanni, only the Kalmunai Point comes within the radius of 27 km.

The LTTE is believed to have buried guns in artillery pits, fortified with 18 inches concrete over hood shelters, with only the barrel of the gun being visible. This is to avoid the counter battery fire by the security forces. The LTTE is also known to use its artillery guns with a greater mobility, towing them by tractors soon after the attack, thereby minimizing the threat of anticipated counter battery fire. Guerrilla positions in the K Point have repeatedly been targeted by the air strikes and Multi Barrel Rocket Launchers. Yet, during the past several months, an LTTE build up was observed in the area. Going by Last Tuesday’s artillery strike, what is clear is that guerrilla positions in Pooneryne are still intact. Yet, given the geographical location of the K Point, which only encompasses a narrow stretch of land, the LTTE’s manoeuvrability is low. The narrow stretch make it easier for the counter battery fire of the security forces to target the LTTE artillery positions, thereby compelling guerrillas to cut short artillery attacks to few rounds in order to avoid counter battery fire.

Firing from interior

But, a more worrisome scenario has now been explored by the security forces commanders. Did the guerrillas fire from the interior of Pooneryne? A 130 mm artillery gun could fire up to 27 km. Yet, the same calibre artillery gun can fire up to 35 km -38 km with the use of extended range shells.

The LTTE is hitherto not known to use extended range shells, which as its name implies enhance the range and precision. Have guerrillas taken possession of them is the worrisome question. If the answer is in the affirmative, this would drastically enhance the capability of the LTTE’s artillery fire power, enabling them to fire from the interior of Pooneryne, where given the terrain, the LTTE would have a greater manoeuvrability.

The guerrilla strategy remains mischievous; indeed, it does keep the security forces guessing of the next LTTE move. That has been a trade mark practice of the LTTE, which took the security forces by surprise in the past.

During the past two months, an LTTE build up was observed in the Mannar area, which suggested that a major Tiger thrust, is imminent for Mannar. However, other than several limited counter attacks against troops operating in the East of Madhu and West of Omanthai, LTTE conduct in the region has been, noticeably, of a defensive nature. The LTTE was digging to offer a fierce resistance on its defence localities in the Wanni defence line. Same reports are emanating from Northern defence localities of the guerrillas in Nagar Kovil and Pallai forward defence line.

There are reports of heavily fortified guerrilla defence localities in the Northern front. Recent developments saw, battlefronts shifting from one theatre to the other. Initially, the fighting flared up in the West of Omanthai and later moved to the East of Madhu. Recently, skirmishes were observed in Weli Oya and a guerrilla build up was observed in Pooneryne.

Stiff resistance

Stiff resistance faced by the security forces in the East of Madhu has virtually halted the troops’ advance. Going by any realistic assessment of the guerrilla military strength, what is predictable is that the security forces would not opt to a major offensive, any time soon. The security forces would continue with limited operations ahead of its defence localities in the Wanni theatre in order to wane the guerrilla man power. The LTTE strategy seems to be one of defensive at the moment. Yet, there is an increasing possibility of the Tigers opting for a surprise raid on one of the main sectors of the security forces deployment, which are Mannar, Vavuniya, Weli Oya and Jaffna.

The loss of the East, forced the guerrillas into the Wanni. However, the irony of the development is that this also enabled the LTTE to consolidate as a unified force. The situation now is very much similar to the immediate post -Riviresa period, when the LTTE, forced out from the Jaffna peninsula, regrouped in the Wanni and overran the Mullaitivu military camp which housed over 1400 security forces personnel.

So the times ahead are mischievous and treacherous. This requires the security forces to act with extra vigilance.

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