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Sri Lanka: The ramifications of the battle of Anuradhapura

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Saturday, 27 October 2007
In its first-ever simultaneous air and ground attack, single-engine, propeller driven aircraft of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) bombed the Air Force base located about 4 km away from Anuradhapura, a city lying 210 km north of Colombo on October 22 at around 3.30 am. After 45 minutes of ground attacks, two light aircraft of the LTTE dropped four aerial bombs on the air base.

That the LTTE would launch a major attack was not a surprise and was expected. But why Anuradhapura? There are several reasons for this. The town is a major transit point for troops going to and fro from the North. It is also a central storing area for the supply of goods to the North. Further, the Air Force had been planning to relocate its facilities at Katunayake there by building a large airport which could accommodate the MIGs which the government had acquired. Since the Government was planning a major offensive in the Wanni, Anuradhapura was a strategic location.

It is not clear as to how many security personnel were killed in the attack; the numbers vary from 9 to 20. Another 20 have sustained varying degrees of damage. On the other hand, the LTTE lost 21 of its Black Tiger suicide cadres which also included three women cadres. The total number of air planes destroyed or damaged by the LTTE attack is suspected to be high with LTTE accounts suggesting the destruction of 17 aircraft and government figures quoting a number as low as three. It was also reported that a Bell 212 helicopter, which flew down from Vavuniya to assist in the fight against the LTTE, crashed in the jungle and was destroyed killing an ace pilot and his crew.

The Air Force base in Anuradhapura functions as a training camp and therefore most of the planes that were destroyed were ones used for training purposes. In addition several reconnaissance planes are also alleged to have been destroyed. Apart from the aircraft the surveillance post was destroyed and the hangers containing planes set on fire while damage was also done to infrastructure. The mission is said to have been undertaken by a specially trained commando suicide squad which entered the Air Force base from three points. They obviously knew the layout and the terrain. The light aircraft of the LTTE were spotted by radar installed in Vavuniya, but in the prevailing confusion, no aircraft was able to intercept the two planes, which also managed to bomb an Air Force base and a smaller army camp on their return to base. The capacity of the MIG 29 to search and destroy the two planes was not put to the test.

Whatever the speculation about numbers and lives lost on both sides this battle is one of the most significant in the history of the Sri Lankan conflict. All experts agree the attack was executed in a well planned manner and achieved its objectives. The question now is what impact it will have on future military planning and the political scenarios which will unfold over the next few months together with the impact it will have on the execution of the undeclared war.

This report spells out the ramifications of the attack. The losses suffered will increase defense expenditure by at least another 20%. The LTTE lost 21 of its commandos. The loss of the reconnaissance planes means that the MIG fighter jets based in Colombo will not be able to find the location of targets and its future bombings will not be able to focus on the targets thereby causing heavy civilian casualties. It will take a few months to acquire more of this type of planes. This also means that air operations will become blunted in the coming months.

Apart from material losses, it is the PSYCHOLOGICAL impact which has to be analyzed. It is to be remembered that during the attack on the Katunayake airport in 2001, 6 commandos were able to debilitate a large number of passenger and fighter aircraft which eventually led to the fall of the then Government and the resumption of negotiations. The psychological impact on the people living in Anuradhapura has been devastating. Many people in the town have already left their homes and people fear that Anuradhapura will be a future battleground. The people in the border villages will also be fearful of further attacks.

How will it affect the morale in the rest of the country? These are early days, but already the stock exchange has plummeted and businessmen are worried about the impact it will have on tourism, since Anuradhapura is a popular tourist resort. The impact of this event will have a demoralizing effect on the troops on the ground. Currently, there are over 20,000 troops stationed in the East and 80,000 troops stationed in the North, of which about 40,000 are amassed around Mannar and the Wanni. Government forces in future engagements with the LTTE will not have the same air support they had before. Leaders in Colombo, particularly the Defense Secretary and the Commander in Chief, would wish to pursue the war at any cost and compel the men on the ground to achieve victories. All this would further demoralize the men on the ground.

The political crisis in the South seems set to further exacerbate and if so will create more turbulence within the Government. Although the Government has a slender majority further attacks by the LTTE might shake the belief of Government Members causing them to respond to overtures by the Opposition to join them by crossing over. This scenario could slowly unfold over the coming months. The initial response of the Sri Lankan armed forces would be to retaliate with massive air raids. It is reported that the Sri Lankan Government Members are consulting their Indian counterparts at the highest level. Sri Lanka may decide to use precision radar guided missiles to target the LTTE.

They are already in consultation with many countries prior to using high-tech weaponry in the region. The Government which enjoyed high popularity mostly due to the President’s pursuit of the war strategy will now have questions. The cost of living is now unbearable to a large number of people and it is in this conjuncture that we see a major shift of opinion against the Government. Even the President’s own opinion polls suggest that the Government is losing its popularity but this does not mean that the UNP has risen in popularity.

The attack by the LTTE comes at a time when it is faced with many setbacks during the year. The loss of control in the East and the retreat of the LTTE from the uncleared areas are some of these setbacks. Further the interception of LTTE ships transporting large quantities of arms should have had a debilitating effect on them. The sustained effort to arrest LTTE procurement agents in the US, France and UK has also helped weaken the LTTEs procurement capacity. It has also lost significant numbers of personnel in the last two years. The air ability of the Sri Lankan Air Force has also hurt the LTTE in the North and East, since precision aerial bombardments have been more accurate and focused and have resulted in heavy losses in the naval and other centers of operations held by the LTTE.

The LTTE seems to be in no hurry to launch attacks. It is however likely more daring and focused attacks will be launched against the Sri Lankan armed forces in the coming months. There is speculation as to why the LTTE has not attacked Colombo with its suicide squads. It could be that the LTTE could still do this but at the moment is focusing on military targets. The Government on the other hand still has sufficient resources, stockpiles of multi barrel artillery and ammunition to last for over two years. Its friends in Iran, Pakistan and China are ready to supply the Government with all the weapons it needs. India is also keen on entering the fray so as to prevent others from gaining a foothold in the country. The Government in the meantime is sure to press for more sophisticated weapons such as radar controlled missiles and other deadly weapons in the pursuit of its objectives i.e. to destroy the LTTE. There will be no retreat from this position. The rhetoric that the Government’s efforts were merely to weaken the LTTE before talks was always a ploy to deceive the international community.

The Government strategy is a high risk strategy but it is convinced that the LTTE has to be destroyed before a political solution is offered to the beleaguered Tamil people. In the pursuit of this strategy, the Government is prepared to ignore international appeals on human rights and a call for a cessation of hostilities. The LTTE in the meantime is prepared for a protracted political military strategy and is prepared to wait for a few years. It believes that the Government cannot pursue such an expensive war and that the South will once again be destabilized. During this period, the LTTE will also work towards persuading the international community and India that the South is not interested in a political solution. Given the Government’s overwhelming superiority in air power and troops on the ground the LTTE will rely mainly on guerilla warfare and its Black Tiger suicide squads, which they did recently with devastating effect. Both sides therefore will be engaged in the mother of all battles and for both it will be a matter of survival.

Comments (2)add comment

Weera said:

Sri Lankan regime took a massive beating!!!

www.sundaytimes.lk/071028/Columns/sitreport.html
2007-10-28 17:12:03

Melisha said:

More to come, patience is a virtue!
2007-10-30 01:55:51

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