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The European Union (EU) ban of the LTTE raises a number of questions in terms of the likelihood of full-scale war or negotiations for peaceful political and constitutional settlement. The immediate effect of the ban would be to freeze LTTE financial assets and make it more difficult for the organisation to raise funds. Politically and psychologically, the LTTE will be isolated as an international pariah — the EU joins a list of countries that have banned the LTTE including the US, India, Canada and the UK.
The peace process As with the other actors involved in the peace process in Sri Lanka, the real standard against which the EU ban needs to be assessed is that of advancing the peace process, the goal presumably of all those unavoidably involved in it as well as those who have chosen to be involved in it. Seen from this perspective, it would seem that the rationale for banning the LTTE is one that assumes that contrition as a consequence on the part of that organisation will make it behave more to the liking of the international community and thereby advance the peace process. Or alternatively that the LTTE will realise the errors of its ways and the importance of the legitimacy the international community can bestow. Unavoidable In the opinion of this columnist these assumptions could turn out to be erroneous. However, given the involvement of the international community in the Sri Lankan peace process and the relative lack of success for the strategy it adopted, banning by the EU was unavoidable in the face of LTTE actions and warnings by the EU that went unheeded. The ‘stick’ as it were had to be used in order to protect the credibility of the international community. In this respect, the EU ban is about LTTE behaviour and not about the legitimacy of the cause they are prosecuting in the context of an ethnic conflict. Furthermore, it relates to past behaviour as opposed to sending a definitive message that the EU sees the LTTE as being beyond redemption. These are important points for the government to take on board. Banning of the LTTE does not constitute carte blanche to the government to behave in any which way it feels it should. Banning of the LTTE means and the EU resolution attests to this, that the international community will use whatever leverage it has with the government to behave in conformity with international standards, especially with regard to human rights and humanitarian concerns, given the creeping sense of deja vu on this front with regard to the alleged security force and paramilitary complicity in violations and the further institutionalisation of a culture of impunity. It also means that the international community will use its leverage to ensure that the government takes negotiations on core political issues more seriously than it appears to at present. LTTE freed up? It could well turn out to be the case that whatever inhibition or deterrent effect that existed with regard to LTTE behaviour before the ban does not operate anymore and in this sense the LTTE is freed up to behave as ‘badly’ as it wants to. Past behaviour of the organisation does not indicate that it will succumb to what it would identify as ‘coercion.’ Its self perception of itself does not allow for this. As mentioned in earlier columns there is also the probable calculation that as long as the international community is interested in the peace process in Sri Lanka, it will have to deal with the LTTE. The ban therefore is not a permanent one, but rather one that marks the end of a phase in the relationship and interaction. The international community and the EU have been boxed into a corner by the LTTE’s unresponsiveness to its earlier warnings and its exploitation of the EU’s reluctance or slowness in engaging in punitive measures against them. There is no escaping from the conclusion that the conflict can only be resolved if there is a dual transformation on the part of the two main parties — the government with respect to power sharing and federalism and the LTTE with respect to entering mainstream democratic politics and giving up violence as the arbiter of social and political grievance. It remains to be seen as to whether the EU ban will advance either. Greater responsibility As pointed out earlier, there will be a greater responsibility on the part of the EU to hold the government to account on the political, human rights and humanitarian fronts. State actors will always have greater leverage with their counterparts. It is therefore of paramount importance that the international community uses this to focus the attention of the government on the substance and trajectory of a political and constitutional settlement. In short, the elaboration of the commitment made in the Oslo Communiqué of December 2002. Yet, the response of the government on the political front will have to take into account the willingness of the LTTE to engage and its behaviour in respect of armed provocation. Whatever the arguments of the LTTE with regard to the consequences of the CFA, in particular the deadlock on the political front and limited results in respect of normalisation and humanitarian issues, there is little to show in the way of demonstrable progress as far as their part in the dual transformation process is concerned. Asymmetry in terms of resources is no justification for this — there has to be change and on both sides. Time will tell As to whether the EU ban has strengthened the LTTE’s resolve to effect a military fait accompli or served as the catalyst for critical self reflection translated into a change of behaviour and attitude will probably be revealed soon. Likewise as to whether the government has recognised that there are messages to it too in the ban and heeded them. We will know too in the not too distant future, as to whether the EU ban marks the end of a phase of international involvement in Sri Lanka and as to whether the next phase will be one of more or less engagement. By courtesy The Morning Leader
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